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Abstract — In this paper, we derive and evaluate a new 
mathematical structure for market-based augmentation of the 
transmission system. The closed-form mathematical structure 
can capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of 
the transmission capacity. The Nash solution concept is employed 
to model the price-quantity game among GenCos. The multiple 
Nash equilibria of the game are located through a 
characterisation of the problem in terms of minima of the  
function. The worst Nash equilibrium is used in the mechanism 
of transmission augmentation. The worst Nash equilibrium is 
defined as the one which maximises the social cost, total 
generation cost + total value of lost load. Thorough analysis of a 
simple three-node network is presented to clearly highlight the 
mechanism of the derived mathematical structure from different 
perspectives.  
 
Index Terms—Transmission Augmentation, Oligopoly 
Electricity Market, Multilevel Programming 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper provides a closed-form mathematical structure 
for market-based transmission augmentation in 
restructured electricity markets. Optimal expansion of the 
network is critical for efficient operation of the electricity 
markets through providing a fair competitive environment for 
market players. Higher than optimal congestion, higher than 
optimal power losses, lower than optimal reliability, imperfect 
competition in generation, and inefficient electricity market 
are the five main costs of insufficient transmission capacity, 
[1]. The mechanisms of transmission augmentation are 
currently ill-defined and almost all of them do not have a 
closed-form mathematical structure. The references [1], and 
[2] set up a framework for transmission planning based on the 
marginal value of transmission capacity. Despite of having a 
closed-form formulation, the mechanism can not capture the 
competition effect of transmission capacity. Reference [3] 
employs the same mathematical structure of [1] but using the 
congestion cost and congestion revenue as the driving signals 
for the need of network expansion. The proper level of 
congestion for a transmission network and the competition 
benefit of transmission capacity are two main shortcomings of 
the proposed framework. References [4] and [5] suggest a new 
                                                          
 
algorithm for transmission augmentation based on the 
congestion cost and the flatness of price profile. The spread of 
electricity price over transmission network is not an exact 
measure of competitiveness and consequently it is not suitable 
for identifying system bottlenecks, [3]. The whole process of 
planning does not have a closed-form mathematical 
formulation and it is unsuccessful in modelling the interaction 
between the availability of transmission capacity and market 
power in generation. Reference [6] suggests two heuristic 
procedures for transmission augmentation. The authors use 
unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium for the set of producers’ 
bids while the bids from the demand side are assumed as 
known from the analysis of the existing market data. Clearly, 
unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium can not reflect the reality 
of the electricity market.  
On the other hand, reference [12] showed numerically that 
transmission expansion reduces generators’ market power. 
Reference [7] has examined empirically the bidding behaviour 
of generators in England and Wales, including the impact of 
transmission constraints. Accordingly, reference [7] reports 
that in England and Wales generators protected by 
transmission constraints bid significantly higher than those 
without this status. Obviously, generating companies’ strategic 
bidding is as an ultimate outcome of market power. This could 
result in a transfer of transmission rents from Market 
Management Company, MMC, or owner of the transmission 
assets to the Generating Company, GenCos. Using a 
simplified version of the power network in California, [13] has 
quantified the impact of local market power and transmission 
capacity. References [8] and [9] show that generators benefit 
from a reduction in transmission capacity. Using a stylized 
version of the North America transmission system, reference 
[14] highlights the effect of transmission capacity on 
encouraging competition among Generating Companies, 
GenCos. Unlike the efficiency effect of transmission capacity, 
the competition effect has not received enough attention in 
transmission planning methodologies.  
TEAM methodology introduced by the California ISO [15] 
can be acknowledged as a good model for market-based 
transmission augmentation. However, it has two drawbacks. 
Firstly, the strategic bidding of GenCos has been estimated 
through a tailor-made and empirical methodology which limits 
its application. Secondly, the whole framework does not have 
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an integrated mathematical framework. 
In National Electricity Market, NEM, Australia, the regulatory 
test introduced by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Competition, ACCC, is used as the transmission augmentation 
criterion for the transmission network service providers over 
different states. In February 2003, the ACCC published a 
discussion report on a review of the regulatory test. Whether 
or not competition Benefit of transmission capacity should be 
included in the regulatory test has been one of the important 
themes of the ACCC discussion report. Commissioned by the 
ACCC in June 2003, reference [16] has carried out a review 
and analysis on the issues arising from the practical 
implementation of the approaches to the measurement of 
competition benefits proposed by interested parties in response 
to the Commission's discussion paper. Reference [17] has 
proposed a heuristic approach for evaluating competition 
benefits of transmission capacity. The integration of 
competition benefit in regulatory test is still under developed 
and demands more research. Using the multilevel 
programming, this paper derives a closed-form mathematical 
structure for transmission augmentation. The solution concept 
of Nash equilibrium has been employed for the analysis of the 
future condition of the electricity market. Multiple Nash 
equilibria has been formulated as the zeros of a nonnegative 
function and the worst case Nash equilibrium is selected as the 
equilibrium point of the electricity market. Finally, the whole 
mechanism of planning is modelled in an integrated 
mathematical framework. While some parts of the derived 
mathematical structure is not unique to this paper, this paper is 
however the first one which designs these mechanisms in an 
integrated structure. Also, to the authors best knowledge, the 
derived structure of transmission augmentation has not been 
used before in the electricity market literature. The 
mathematical derivation of the problem is detailed in section 
II. Section III applies the mechanisms on a simple three node 
network. Finally, concluding remarks will close this paper.  
II.  BUILDING THE MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE FOR 
TRANSMISSION AUGMENTATION 
In the light of the electricity market in Australia, the 
Transmission Network Service Provider, TNSP, is assumed as 
a regulated monopoly business. The TNSP is required to 
efficiently plan the transmission network and provide a fair 
competitive environment for market participants. The 
Generating Companies, GenCos, are assumed as independent 
business bodies competing for having the highest share from 
the electricity market. Finally, the Market Management 
Company, MMC, as the manger and operator of the electricity 
market which is completely independent from TNSP and 
GenCos. Now we consider a decentralised noncooperative 
decision system in which one leader and several followers of 
equal status are involved. We assume that the leader and 
followers may have their own decision variables and objective 
functions. The leader can only influence the reaction of 
followers through his own decision variables, while the 
followers have full authority to decide how to optimise their 
objective functions with respect to leader‘s decision as well as 
other followers ‘ decision. Multilevel programming [10] is 
used as a powerful tool for deriving the transmission 
augmentation structure. Subsection A deals with the 
application of the Nash concept for modelling of competition 
among GenCos. The formulation of Nash concept as an 
optimisation problem will enable the structure to locate all 
Nash equilibria of the game. Subsequently, subsection B 
models the TNSP as the leader of the game. Multiple Nash 
points are tackled through the selection of the worst Nash 
equilibrium in terms of total cost of generation and total value 
of lost load.  
A.  Nash equilibria of the simultaneous move game on price -
quantity among GenCos as zeros of  function 
The cost function of a generating company can be modelled as 
a quadratic function of the form (1). 
 
         (1) 
 
In (1), , , and  are the cost function 
coeffiecinets. Technically, the coefficient  is close to zero 
and the quadratic cost function can be approximated by a 
linear function of the form (2).  
 
         (2) 
 
In (2),  is the total generation capacity, and  is the 
generation level of GenCo i assigned by the MMC. Each 
GenCo offers a price-quantity pair  to the MMC to 
participate in the market. The marginal cost of a GenCo and 










Fig. 1, The marginal cost curve and the biding strategy of a GenCo 
 
The  and  are the minimum and maximum 
limits on price offer of a GenCo. Theses limits are usually set 
by the electricity market regulator. The competition on price, 
the competition on quantity and the competition on both price 
and quantity are economic structures established to model 
GenCos in an electricity market. This paper uses the price-
quantity game to model GenCos in an electricity market. 
Given the bidding strategies of other GenCo and TNSP ‘s 
planning schedule revealed, each GenCo can find its optimal 
strategy using the bilevel programming problem in (3).  
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In (3),  and  are  and  
matrices where the column related to the slack bus is 
omitted,  and  are the total number of buses and total 
number of lines in the system.  is the vector of bus angles,  
and  are the generation level of committed generators and the 
served demand of retailers. In (3), ( ) is the Lagrange 
multipliers of the associated constraints. The vector   is the 
price of energy at different network connection points. 
Capacity of the transmission system has been modelled 
through vector .  
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, the (3) 
can be generalised as in (4). 
 
                                                        (4) 
 
Where in (4),  is the TNSP decision vector, 
 is the action vector of the ith GenCO, and 
 with m as the total number of 
GenCos.  and z vector is constrained by the 
set of Z. Z is the set defined by the constraints of the inner 
optimisation problem in (3).  
Since all GenCos are of equal status, they must reveal their 
strategies simultaneously. Hence, for all GenCos a popular 
solution concept is the Nash equilibrium.  
The Nash equilibrium problem can be formulated as the 
problem of finding the zeros of function  which is defined in 
(5). 
 
Definition: Let Y be a nonempty set which defines the strategy 
space of all GenCos participating in the electricity market. The 
function  is defined as (5): 
 
        (5) 
 
The following theorem can be derived consequently; 
 
Theorem: The function  is real and 
nonnegative on Y. Also, Nash equilibria are the zeros of .  
 
Proof: The theorem can be proved by the classical 
definition of Nash equilibrium.  
 
Having (5) as the alternative formulation of Nash equilibria, 
the mathematical framework of the competition among 
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If an array  satisfies that 
, then y must be a solution of (6) and 
consequently a Nash equilibrium of the game. The set of all 
optimal solutions of (5) are the Nash equilibria of the price-
quantity game among GenCos. If (5) does not have any 
optimal solution, there is no Nash equilibrium of GenCos in 
the given bilevel programming problem. Section B addresses 
the issue of multiple Nash equilibria and the TNSP objective 
function.  
B.  The worst Nash equilibrium and the TNSP mathematical 
structure for augmentation 
The set of Nash equilibria of the price-quantity game can be 
found by solving the optimization problem formulated in (6).  
Reference [17] uses an average method to deal with many 
Nash equilibria of the quantity game among GenCos. This 
method calculates the situation of the market under each each 
Nash equilibrium. Then after, the method takes an average for 
each of variables of interest in the process of transmission 
augmentation. In some cases the average of interested variable 
approaches zero and can not provide any valuable information 
to the process of transmission augmentation. Also, all different 
Nash equilibria are treated with the same weight which is not a 
true assumption.  
This paper uses the worst Nash equilibrium in terms of total 
cost to the society for modelling of electricity market situation 
in the process of transmission augmentation. The worst Nash 
equilibrium is the one which has the highest social cost to the 
society. The social cost is the total cost of generation and total 
value of lost load. By doing this, firstly, the worst equilibrium 
of the market is used in transmission augmentation as a signal 
which is always available and secondly, all Nash equilibria are 
not treated with same weight. The mathematical formulation 
of the worst Nash equilibrium is formulated in (7). 
 
                                               (7) 
 
In (7),  is the total cost to the society which 
must be computed over each of Nash equilibria of the 
GenCos’ price-quantity game.   
Suppose the TNSP has m options of upgrade and n options of 
expansion for the market-based augmentation of the high 
voltage transmission system on its given territory. For the m 
options of upgrade,  ,  and for the n options of 
expansion,  ,  are the vectors of maximum 
thermal capacity which can be built on the transmission 
corridors of upgrade and expansion, respectively. Vector K is 
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defined as ( . Similarly,   and  
 are the vectors of the investment cost for the 
transmission upgrade and expansion projects, respectively. 

















Fig.2, TNSP’s transmission projects
 
Since TNSP pays the investment cost of upgrade or 
expansion, it is desirable to upgrade and/or expand the 
transmission system with the minimum cost. Mathematically, 





           
           
          
 
           
                 
                  
                  
                         
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                                        (8) 
 
 and  are the maximum values for the  and  
as the TNSP’s design parameters. 
Optimisation set (8) can be used as a closed-form 
mathematical structure for transmission augmentation. In (8), 
the TNSP moves first and designs the future transmission 
system. Based on the planning schedule, the Nash equilibria of 
the price-quantity game are calculated. In next step, the worst 
Nash equilibrium is found and the generation costs and total 
value of lost load of the worst Nash equilibrium are added to 
the TNSP ‘s planning schedule cost as the total cost of 
expansion. For demonstration purposes, section III applies the 
proposed mechanism of transmission planning to a simple 
three-node network without engaging with the numerical 
solution of the derived mathematical structure.  
 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISIM ON A SIMPLE 
THREE-NODE SYSTEM 
The proposed mathematical structure in (8) is applied on a 
simple three-node system. The single line diagram of the 
example system is as shown in figure 3. GenCos and retailers 











Fig. 3, The single line diagram of the three-node example system 
 
Transmission lines L1, L2, and L3 connect buses 1, 2, and3. 
The marginal transmission investments on these lines are 1.5, 
1, and 0.75 $/MW.  
There are two competing generators labelled as GenCo1 and 
GenCo5, and two competing retailers labelled as R1 and R2 in 
the 3-bus example system. The TNSP is responsible for the 
market-based augmentation of the system. The information of 
the generators, retailers, and transmission network are shown 
in tables I, II, and III respectively. The upgrade or expansion 
projects for the existing transmission system are collected in 
table IV. 
 
TABLE I GENERATORS ‘DATA 
Generator (MW) ($/MW) 
GenCo1 200 30 
GenCo2 200 20 
 
TABLE II RETAILERS ‘DATA 
Retailer (MW) ($/MW) 
R1 150 10,000 
R2 200 10,000 
 
TABLE III TRANSMISSION NETWORK DATA 
Line# From To Reactance(p.u.) Limit(MW) 
1 B2 B1 0.2 20 
2 B2 B3 0.2 40 
3 B1 B3 0.2 30 
 
TABLE IVTRANSMISSION NETWORK UPGRADE DATA 







1 B2 B1 40 1.5 
2 B2 B3 40 0.75 
3 B1 B3 40 1.0 
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For each GenCo, the  in the price-quantity pair 
 offered to the MMC have been approximated by a 
set of discrete variables. The  can be varied from true 
marginal cost to 10 times of marginal cost in steps of 1 and 
 can be selected from 25% of true generation capacity to 
total generation capacity in steps of 8.33%. The strategy plane 











Fig. 4, The strategy plane of GenCo i 
 
The bidding strategy of GenCo 1 and GenCo 2 considering the 





















Fig. 6, Marginal cost and the strategy of GenCo 2 considering the existing 
transmission system 
 
Regarding the GenCo 1, it offers a supply curve of 150MW at 
90 $/MW. The GenCo 2 offers a similar supply curve of 
66.6MW at 80 $/MW. Both GenCos enjoy from bidding a 
price above marginal cost and withholding their generation 
capacity. This strategic behaviour is the immediate result of 
insufficient transmission capacity.  
Applying the proposed methodology formulated in (8), for 
each transmission augmentation schedule, the TNSP calculates 
all Nash equilibria of the price-quantity game between GenCo 
1 and GenCo 2. Among the Nash equilibria set, the 
equilibrium which maximises the total cost to the society in 
trems of total generation dispatch cost and the total value of 
lost load are selected. The worst Nash equilibrium is used for 
electricity market studies in the horizon year of the planning. 
The summation of the transmission investment cost and the 
social cost calculated for the worst Nash equilibrium are the 
objective function of the TNSP for that specific transmission 
planning schedule. It is clear that the TNSP will choose the 
transmission augmentation plan with the minimum cost.  
The TNSP has seven different planning schedules as tabulated 
in table V. 
 







equilibria  ($) 




19 1,418,300 1,418,300 
L1 30 1,686,333 1,686,393 
L2 46 1,443,500 1,443,540 
L3 20 1,351,167 1,351,197 
L1-L2 21 1,671,333 1,671,433 
L1-L3 50 1,351,167 1,351,257 
L2-L3 1 674,333 674,403 
L1-L2-L3 31 1,030,167 1,030,297 
 
Based on the table V, the TNSP will approve the building of 
lines two and three in order to improve the electricity market 
performance. By doing this, the total cost has decreased 
dramatically from $1,418,300 to 674,403 which corresponds 
to about %52 of decrease in the TNSP cost. The difference of 
total generation cost and total value of lost load before and 
after expansion corresponds to the efficiency and competition 
benefit of the transmission capacity. In our example, the 
efficiency and competition benefits of transmission capacity is 
about $1,418,300 - $674,333 = $743967.  
The offer curves of GenCos 1 an 2 before and after 





















Fig. 8, Marginal cost and the strategy of GenCo 2 before and after 
transmission augmentation 
 
As it is clear, after the approval of lines 2 and 3, the strategic 
 
 
Marginal Cost curve 
 
Possible action  




Marginal Cost curve 
 
The offer curve 






Marginal Cost curve 
 
The offer curve 






Marginal Cost curve 
 












The offer curve of GenCo 1 
after transmission 
augmentation  




The offer curve of GenCo 2 
after transmission 
augmentation  
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behaviour of GenCo 1 and GenCo 2 are limited. The GenCo 1 
offers its true marginal cost and its total generation capacity 
for participating in the energy market. Similarly, the GenCo 2 
offers its true marginal cost with 83.34MW for participating 
the energy market. Although, the GenCo 2 still withholds 
some of its generation capacity, compared with its offered 
capacity before transmission augmentation, it offers more of 
its total generation capacity after the TNSP planning schedule.  
Although we did not engage with designing a numerical 
solution for the derived mathematical structure, but the 
application of the proposed mechanism on a simple three-node 
network shows that the designed mechanism can effectively 
capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of 
the transmission capacity.  
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In a fully competitive electricity market, each participant 
should bid at its true marginal cost with the true generation 
capacity to maximise its revenue. However, a practical 
electricity market is not perfectly competitive because of (1) 
the limited number of GenCos and retailers in the electricity 
market, (2) the limited transmission capacity, and (3) the 
imperfect information among market players. This paper has 
derived and evaluated a closed-form mathematical structure to 
capture both the competition benefit and the efficiency benefit 
of transmission capacity. The mathematical structure employs 
the Nash solution concept to model the price-quantity game 
among GenCos. To locate all Nash equilibria of the game, the 
Nash problem has been formulated as an optimisation 
problem. This formulation has been done by defining the so-
called  function which is a real nonnegative function. The   
function is strictly positive if the combined generators strategy 
is not a Nash equilibrium and equal to zero otherwise. 
Accordingly, the set of Nash equilibria is the set of zeros of 
the  function. The worst Nash equilibrium has been selected 
in the process of the transmission augmentation. The worst 
Nash equilibrium is defined as the one which maximises the 
total cost to the society. The summation of total cost of 
generation and the total value of the lost load is used as the 
total cost to the society. Although we did not engage with the 
numerical solution of the proposed mathematical formulation, 
but the application of the mechanism on a simple three-node 
network is very satisfactory. The authors are currently 
developing an effective numerical solution for the derived 
mathematical structure to be applied on the eastern Australian 
transmission system.  
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